I've been recommended to read Armies of Sand to explain how Arab militaries consistently go to shit and lose wars they have no right losing; so maybe I'll be able to get some answers from that, since it takes a deep look into Arabic culture and the background of the various countries in the region.
Book doesn't come until Saturday though and it'll probably take me a few weeks to get through it if work is busy.
Oh they've definitely changed dramatically. I am not a military historian, I've just read a handful of books on the subject. But the two broad categories in which things have changed:
1) Disposability
Up to and including WWII, soldiers were still more or less like pawns on a battlefield. To be used and, if necessary, sacrificed.
These days, the army really really really doesn't want their dudes to die, if they can help it. Because a dude dying means like a million dollars worth of gear and training going up in smoke, and months of time to replace him
2) Independence
Up to and including WWI, soldiers were expected to follow orders, stay in formation, and generally shut off their brains. In modern warfare it is very, very, very not like this.
I was recently reading a book called Armies of Sand that seeks to answer the question (I'm paraphrasing) of "why does Israel consistently curbstomp Arab armies 10x their size?" One of the answers given is that Arab armies haven't adapted to modernity. They wait for orders instead of taking initiative and acting independently. The book points out that the IDF (as well as other modern western forces) devolve a considerably higher amount of planning and decisionmaking to lower levels of command than in the past, and how this is necessary on a modern battlefield. Modern battlefields just move too damn fast to keep the (eg) napoleonic army norms of "follow orders and stay in formation even under fire"
Re the Houthis apparently capturing three whole Saudi brigades:
> On the U.S. side, the effort to train Arab militaries has been sincere, persistent, and doomed. The U.S. Air Force has been trying to train the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) to fly the F-16 for decades. However, well into the 21st century, the EAF’s standard pattern of attack has called for two planes to approach nearly simultaneously from either side of a target, on a collision course. Consequently, even in training exercises, one plane out of every pair has to swerve at the last minute to avoid a midair collision—causing that pilot’s bombs to go far from the target.
> Because the Egyptians don’t record their missions or debrief, let alone actually critique their own performances, and no one at operational levels wants to rock the boat by pointing out that their tactics are suicidal and their training rigged, all of these practices have become institutionalized elements of EAF training, and U.S. pilots have reported constant frustration trying to convince the EAF that its school solutions are not only wrong but potentially fatal. One American pilot who had trained with the EAF told me that it was “probably good” that the Egyptians didn’t use live ordnance in practice because if they did, they would lose a lot of their aircraft and pilots to these ridiculous tactics and distorted training practices.
See here, or Pollack's full-length treatment <em>Armies of Sand: the Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness</em> for why our Arab allies -- and enemies, they gave the Soviets aneurysms too -- suck the way they do.
Eh, Israel would definitely lose this war. Arab militaries are mostly weak and poorly run (1, 2), but Turkey, Nigeria, and Indonesia all have fairly effective militaries. Also, Morocco and Egypt, the two most powerful and effective Arab militaries, would not be sitting this war out like they have more recent Arab-Jewish wars.
Of course, that disparity in military effectiveness sort of explains why this whole idea is laughable. This entire pseudo-state would effectively result in a few powerful cultures and militaries dominating everyone else, supposed brotherhood in Islam be damned. It would basically be a renewed Ottoman Empire, with Turks in the drivers' seat alongside Indonesians and a few other chosen peoples. I'm fairly certain the last time this happened there were one or two Arab revolts.
>Armies of Sand
The author is the shit: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenneth\_M.\_Pollack
https://www.amazon.com/Armies-Sand-Present-Military-Effectiveness/dp/0190906960
Related note, this is a very good study of Arab military ineffectiveness: https://www.amazon.com/Armies-Sand-Present-Military-Effectiveness/dp/0190906960
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Defending Iran: From Revolutionary Guards to Ball… | - | - | 0.0/5.0 |
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Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of… | - | - | 4.5/5.0 |
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Hey there! I recently finished Kenneth Pollack's Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness , and it's fantastic! Pollack provides a comprehensive overview of the socio-cultural, economic and political factors that impacted the development and effectiveness of Arab militaries. Definitely worth a read!
On the heels of that, I also recently finished Gawdat Bahgat and Anoushiravan Ehteshami's Defending Iran: From Revolutionary Guards to Ballistic Missiles . The book provides an excellent overview of Iran's offensive and defensive capabilites, accounting for its strategic vision and both its hard and soft power capabilities.
Hey there! I recently finished Kenneth Pollack's Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness , and it's fantastic! Pollack provides a comprehensive overview of the socio-cultural, economic and political factors that impacted the development and effectiveness of Arab militaries. Definitely worth a read!
On the heels of that, I recently picked up Gawdat Bahgat and Anoushiravan Ehteshami's Defending Iran: From Revolutionary Guards to Ballistic Missiles . The book provides an excellent overview of Iran's offensive and defensive capabilites, accounting for its strategic vision and both its hard and soft power capabilities.
Hey there! I recently picked up Kenneth Pollack's Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness , and it's fantastic!
Pollack providesa comprehensive overview of the socio-cultural, economic and political factors that impacted the development and effectiveness of Arab militaries. Definitely worth a read!
Don't abuse the word racist, these guys aren't predisposed to crime, they just live in a culture where libel, bullying, and theft are just seen as normal ways to get stuff done. I once got into a fight on r/egypt with a lady who insisted that all dogs are rabid vindictive maniacs and the solution was to teach kids to throw rocks at them (BTW, Egypt has +1,000,000 feral dogs and cats on the streets).
Tunisia is a competitive oligarchy with many factions and murder and a domestic DAESH uprising a few years ago and frequent massive corruption busts and has been in a constant state of crisis since the Arab Revolt. Many people voted in favor of Sharia law and the election of clerics to office.
As for Lebanon, well one of the few things they'll all agree on is there's nothing more permanent than a temporary situation. At one point, militias that owned the bulk of the illicit marijuana trade made threats if pot was legalized. Why? Their near monopoly allowed them to inflate the price. Same goes for electronics, where licenses to deal computers are given by officials to personal friends and, uh, "business partners."
But I'll eventually I'll write a comprehensive history of the Arab-Israeli Wars. For you, I recommend "Armies of Sand" by Kenneth Pollack. He's a war journalist who breaks it down exceptionally thoroughly by eliminating every other explanation for the bizarre behavior of this region except one: Culture.
>And if Ethiopia did decide to divert the course of the Nile, then Egypt could absolutely attack Ethiopia
Except it can't. They don't share a border, Egypts planes can't reach Ethiopia aaand Sudan is on Ethiopia's side.
>and with their superior military might they may just crush Ethiopia and make it part of Egypt. Then there will be no disputing who owns it.
Egypt and Arab armies at large have failed time and again. They are usually quite weak for a myriad of reasons. But it's a rather well studied phenomenon. Egypt couldn't take Ethiopia if it tried, it would be stuck in a quagmire and lose the war. Ethiopia is perhaps one of the most defensible nations on earth and the Ethiopians actually have recent war-fighting experience.
Understanding modern Arab military effectiveness by the CFR
<em>Why Arabs lose wars</em> - Middle East Quarterly
>If Ethiopia did completely stop Egypt's lifeblood, then I don't think there would be too many nations in the world who would support them.
And they won't, unless Egypt attacks first, then plenty of nations would support Ethiopia. China would be first to jump at the chance of supporting Ethiopia, it funded the dam and won't see a cent back from their investment if its destroyed.
Egypt has no choice but to accept that Ethiopia is going to fill that reservoir at the speed it wants.
Best book on the subject:
Armies of Sand, by Kenneth M. Pollack
https://www.amazon.com/Armies-Sand-Present-Military-Effectiveness/dp/0190906960
It boils down to the Arab culture and mentality. If you don't want read the whole book there is a lecture as well: https://youtu.be/4VzdQuBUqJw