What is Reddit's opinion of Ethical Intuitionism?

From 3.5 billion Reddit comments

Which part? That philosophers rely on intuition? It's not like it's a secret they're trying to hide, they'll openly admit that they are. Have any discussion with a moral realist and the argument for it is ultimately going to rest on some strong intuitions the person has

Look, there's even a book about it! https://www.amazon.com/Ethical-Intuitionism-M-Huemer/dp/0230573746

Objective means mind-independent and can be true or false regardless of our attitudes and opinions about that thing.

An intuition is an initial, intellectual appearance, how something seems to us. We use intuition every day to confirm a lot of things. “Something can’t be green and red all over” is an intuitive statement and doesn’t require empirical evidence. Rejecting intuition as a means of acquiring objective knowledge is ridiculous, because we literally use it every day.

You should read the literature on it, because you’re not being totally correct in your definitions and reasoning.

https://www.amazon.com/Ethical-Intuitionism-M-Huemer/dp/0230573746

If you would like a broad overview of metaethical theory that presents the various viewpoints in a fairly simple to understand format, while also offering extra material covering more complex aspects, see Michael Huemer's Ethical Intuitionism. He does have a moral objectivist thesis in the book, but he covers all the various viewpoints very fairly, and he has a special talent for breaking complex arguments down into simple chunks. I think his argument is weakest against moral nihilism, but he demonstrates fairly conclusively that subjectivism is untenable.

> No, you haven't explained the common basis.

Intuitions. I really recommend the book.

> Let's throw out all this shit about solipsism and get to the meat of it.

That is the meat of it. Seriously, come on. You want to have a discussion about how we can know things about morality without addressing the issue about how we can know things about anything?

The answer is no.

> How in Arceus's green earth do you get so far as to say murder being wrong is a fact?

In mentioning murder specifically, it seems you're again confusing ethics with metaethics. I'm not interested in ethics right now, just metaethics, so I'll not get drawn into specifics.

We can accept moral realism because the foundation on which we can claim anything as fact, intuitions, necessitates we accept moral intuitions as evidence if we're to be consistent. The only way out of this trap is to suggest that either we don't actually accept any intuitions as evidence, which I've proven to be wrong several times, or that we don't have moral intuitions, with is just flagrantly incorrect (unless you have a personality disorder).

This is a really difficult question and people disagree, you could also ask the fine people over at r/asksocialscience. More philosophically, Michael Huemer has written a book on Ethical Intuitionism. My own thought is that if there need to be philosophical arguments for it, it cannot be said to exist innately, though social science may also return different answers from different studies. As I said, this is a difficult question that different people have different opinions on in the philosophy world.

> There is no question at all that all ethics are subjective.

Of course there is. Moral realism vs. anti-realism is one of the central debates in meta-ethics. (And most professional philosophers are moral realists, by the way.) This doesn't mean moral realism is true, of course. But there is clearly a question -- there is reasonable debate to be had on the matter. From my studies, the arguments fall in favor of moral realism.

It's a ridiculous question though. Moral facts are objective, not something to be decided. No one 'decides' what the truth is. The task is to figure out the truth, not decide it.

https://www.amazon.com/Ethical-Intuitionism-M-Huemer/dp/0230573746

> Again......IP is not physical property.

Whether it is tangible or not is irrelevant here. Property is just an ethical or legal entitlement to a thing. If you think morality is subjective, then you must think all legal entitlements are equally (in)valid in a sense (whether they are regarding tangibles or not). Talking about scarcity or physicality at that point becomes completely irrelevant -- you just have to acknowledge that people have the might (either through themselves or through other institutions) to enforce IP, and, at most (without an ethical framework), say you don't like it.

> You COULD take on the burden of defending IP on your own, but no one does in practice. They employ the state (which completely upsets the costs/benefit ratio of the action).

Big companies frequently are willing to spend very hefty amounts of money to protect their IP (even if poorer individuals wouldn't.) Yes, the state is often (always?) used too, but that's because our entire legal system is built around the state -- almost everyone uses the state to some extent for any other types of property disputes as well. And why would it matter whether someone defended it themselves or used the state to do it? If you think morality is subjective, then you have no real substantive reason to object to someone enforcing IP against you, even through a state. All you can do is say you don't like it -- there is no basis to say it is 'illegitimate' or nonexistent (unless you restrict discussion purely to an ethical sense, in which case you could only call it as non-existent/invalid as any other property rights.)

> No, morality is subjective. That's the point I'm trying to convey here. David Friedman covers that in great detail here.

I have not listened to that. I might eventually. But Friedman is a moral realist. (He is a consequentialist in normative ethics, and an ethical intuitionist in meta-ethics.) He doesn't believe morality is all subjective, according to many of the things of his I've read. He is probably criticizing a particular subset of libertarian moral theories (natural rights, self-ownership, homesteading, etc) there, which he has done elsewhere too. I doubt he is actually saying meta-ethical subjectivism is true there.

In any case, subjectivism as a meta-ethical position has been thoroughly defeated, I think. (See Huemer's Ethical Intuitionism [AMZN] [MEGA (free! no ip, right?)] for my views on it, if interested.)

I responded to another comment of yours in this thread here which mainly had to do with the metaphysics of how moral properties could exist.

But you might also be interested in epistemic justification (what justifies our believing some things are right and wrong or good and bad, as opposed to being devoid of all moral properties altogether?)

My answer would be the epistemic theory called phenomenal conservatism. This theory basically says we are justified in believing things are as they appear, unless we have countervailing reasons to reject those appearances. (Note: the term appearance here is used broadly to mean not only empirical visual appearances, but also intellectual appearances, like logical relations, or recollecting one's memories, etc.) That goodness and badness exists certainly appears to be true, at least superficially, to almost everyone (including people who reject moral objectivism.) So the question then becomes: what reasons do we have for rejecting that appearance? It turns out to be difficult to present uncontroversial arguments to reject the prima facie support for moral realism, as philosopher Michael Huemer details in his book Ethical Intuitionism [Free PDF] [Paperback@AMZN] in which he presents a case for moral realism and defends it from all other moral theories (including moral nihilism.) He also has an article from the book on his website about Moral Knowledge, though this chapter is the fifth in the book, and to some extent builds off of previous chapters and premises. (See the PDF book link for those. Buy it if you like it.)

> yes i agreed that AE is problematic...

It's worse than just problematic. It's not like there is just a premise or entailment which seems counter-intuitive or something of the sort. It fundamentally confuses some basic concepts in philosophy. It is outright amateurish, and outright false.

> When defining property upon this exclusionary principle alone, property becomes positive.

That's like defining "God" to be the universe, and then saying "Look around, God exists." The problem is that libertarians who argue this way are guilty of equivocation -- they say property is not normative, but merely a positive description. But then they eventually switch to a normative definition of property when condemning someone for theft, for example. Pretty much every philosopher who talks about property is talking about normative concept. When you redefine it, you are simply not talking about the same thing anymore. You are talking about something else.

In addition, what you are advocating isn't property -- it is mere control. The mere fact that someone (animal or otherwise) uses physical force to defend some area or thing doesn't suggest that this thing justly belongs to them (which is what property is about).

> i just get tired of all the AE bashing when nothing better has been put forth.... everyone can criticize AE but noone has come up with anything better...

Like I said, you don't have to put forth another theory to debunk this one. AE fails on its own merits, and should be rejected and condemned and made fun of for its amateurish faults, even without any other theory to put forth.

That said, there are plenty better theories of property, and plenty better theories of ethics, than AE. I might even go so far as to say all of the mainstream ethical theories are vastly superior to AE -- (even egalitarian and Rawlsian theories, which, IMO, aren't that convincing.) For meta-ethics, read Huemer's Ethical Intuitionism. For normative ethics, read up on Moderate Deontology. For theories of property, read up on Nozick's Entitlement Theory. This provides a much better foundation for objectivity in ethics and libertarian-ish conclusions in theories of property.

> They're insubstantial because there's nothing forcing or even compelling us to follow them

That something is objectively good or bad doesn't suggest there is any mystical force making us act in accordance with those things. (And, conversely, the absence of such a force doesn't suggest there aren't any objective moral facts. They are simply evaluative claims -- not claims about something which can physically force you into certain behaviors.)

Whether normative claims are confirmable or not is irrelevant to whether some of them can be true or false at all. (Though I also disagree that there is no way to confirm them. For my meta-ethical views, see Huemer's <em>Ethical Intuitionism</em>, including the chapter about how we can gain moral knowledge, and the chapter about moral disagreements. There doesn't seem to be any good reasons for you believing you have a right to bubblegum, so unless you can give those, I highly doubt you are warranted in believing it.)

> You're not making points, you are stating your beliefs.

They aren't mutually exclusive. For example, pointing out that semantical analysis reveals moral claims are claims about objective properties isn't a non-point. It emphatically is a point. I also believe the point is true.

It also isn't an undebatable point -- there is plenty of reasonable disagreement to be had over all three of the points I've listed. But entire books have been written on it, and I wasn't about to write another one in a reddit comment. I will have a conversation about any of the three points I've brought up though, two of which I've already given links which argued for those points. Pick any of the three points and we will start with it, but let me know what your background in the study of meta-ethics is first though, because I don't want to assume too much.

(I can also recommend philosopher Michael Huemer's &quot;Ethical Intuitionism&quot; for reading, which argues for each of these three points and more with considerable philosophical rigor.)

> Also, this specific belief you have makes basically any argument you want convenient via the claim that it is the way you perceive it.

What do you mean? Can you provide examples? Do you have access to evidence that doesn't rely on your perception? How do you even know your computer is sitting in front of you without your perceiving it?

> Systems that we implement in society act upon the real world and their results can be quantified to assess its effectiveness at meeting society's real-world obligations to its citizens. This necessitates an approach grounded in evidence in order to acquire the best system over time.

(Emphasis mine)

What constitutes a best system? What obligations do we have, and how do we determine we have them? You seem to be using moral language, even while denying there are really obligations and better/worse systems at all.

> This is just a big non sequitur. We're not even discussing the details of the means in any meaningful way here. Instead we're getting lost in philosophical thinking when there are real-world problems that can be solved.

You seemed to think emphasizing the importance of maximizing the quality of life of all people was of value, yes? Do you think this belief of yours is without philosophical underpinning, or that it we can discard philosophy and accept it as some sort of default goal? Perhaps you think there is a difference in being pragmatic and solving problems vs. "getting lost" in philosophy. But I'm not lost. We all have underlying philosophies which guide our actions and beliefs. I'm merely practicing the critical examination of my philosophical foundations. Others who bear the flag of "thinking in the real world" tend to take philosophical positions just like I do -- except they believe they aren't, and remain uncritical of the assumptions they inherit.

I know you don't want any Huemer facts...but I thought it was cool that Stuart Rachels wrote a back cover review for Michael Huemer's book on Ethical Intuitionism.

I had that Elements too, though unfortunately I'm in the same boat as you so no recommendations. Just...please don't dogmatically adopt ethical theory that leads you to the conclusions you want to be true, m'kay? (cough Ethics of Liberty)